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THE HUMAH SPIRIT IN SPACE
B.J. Bluth, Ph.D.
Professor of Sociology
California State University, Northridge
ABSTRACT
The space ships which have come 
from the human imagination have been 
extraordinarily successful. Does 
mankind have the spirit to reside in 
those ships/ and newly planned space 
stations for long periods of time?
Evidence about the performance of 
people in isolated and confined 
environments for long periods of time 
raises issues that need examination. 
The Soviet experience in the Salyut 6 
shows signs of interpersonal and 
individual strain. Studies of the 
Arctic/ Antarctic/ submarines/ 
oceanographic research vessels/ 
simulations/ and many other cases 
indicate similar episodes that effect 
human performance/ and consequently 
impinge on mission safety and success.
INTRODUCTION
In his diary written during his 
first six month flight aboard the 
Salyut 6 Space Station, Valery Ryumin 
comments that the experience is much 
like that of two college roomates. 
There are difficulties with the living 
and working complex/ but there is also 
the human problem. "Here we are 
totally alone. Each uttered word 
assumes added importance. One must 
bear in mind - constantly - the other's 
good and bad sides/ anticipate his 
thinking/ the ramifications of a wrong 
utterance blown out of proportion".!
In these environments where there
is little privacy/ isolation from the 
rest of the world and its affairs/ and 
confinement to restrictive quarters 
serving a small/ unchanging group of 
people/ there seem to be numerous
instances of disruptive interpersonal 
problems which impact the mission 
safety and effectiveness. There is 
also an indication that such problems 
may have variable elements which can be 
adjusted to provide a more conducive 
interpersonal network. Knowing what 
problems might be expected/ and what 
techniques might work is the next step 
in doing actual work in long term space 
operations.
PRECEDENTS
Considerable research has been 
done looking at small groups in 
conf ined/ isolated, and stressful 
environments/ including the Antarctic/ 
submarines/ oc e an og raph ic resea rch 
vessels/ u n d er s ea r ese ar c h labs/ 
Alas'-;an oil pipe construction sites, 
oil tankers/ and especially designed 
simulations. None of these situations 
exactly replicates permanent human 
operation of a space facility. The 
complex factors which vary from these 
analogs include crew size, the degree 
and type of isolation and confinement, 
the composition and organization of the 
crew, t h e w o r k t o be d o n. e , t h e 
historical, context, and especially the 
unique characteristic of space -- 
w e i ghtiess ness and a11 i ts re1a ted 
influences. What is important about 
these s t u. d i e s i s t h a t s o m e o f t h e 
predictions have been verified in the 
Soviet experiences aboard the Salyut 6 
Space Station. This suggests a careful 
look at these studies will provide some 
ideas about what dilemmas might arise 
in. long term missions*
The Arctic and the Antarctic
A n t a. r c t i c s t a t i o n s, w h e r e t h e 
con f i n e m e n t d u e t o w i n t e r i n g - o v e r 
varies between six months and a year,
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vary in size r with large stations 
numbering over 100, and smaller 
research bases having crews of 14 to 
40. Crews are composed of Naval 
personnel who are responsible for the 
maintenance of the station and civilian 
research scientists.
So far, one murder has been 
reported2, stabbings, and many reports 
of stress. The Naval contingent of 
crews stationed at various Antarctic 
stations showed an increase of 40% in 
symptoms of anxiety, depression, 
insomnia, and hostility.3 Though the 
percentage increases were not as high 
for the civilian scientists, they 
showed the same symptoms. Both groups 
were most threatened by emotional 
instability and social incompatibility. 
A consistent emphasis on 
personality-oriented behavior developed 
as opposed to the expected 
task-oriented behavior.4
What is important about these 
incidents is that they are not easily 
predictable. "Neither emotional 
stability* social compatibility, nor 
overall performance could be accurately 
predicted by clinical evaluations, 
personality scales, opinion survey 
items, or personal history."4
Qceanographic Research Vessels
In oceanographic research ships 
coming from Woods Hole, Scripps 
Institute, and elsewhere, problems 
between the ship's crew and the 
scientists also occur. On one 
occasion, a crew tossed overboard a 
large part of the specimens gathered on 
the two year voyage of the British 
Antarctic R/V BransfieId because of a 
dispute about the use of a freezer to 
store soft drinks.5
Cultural differentiation between 
the various segments of the crews: 
merchant marine, ex-Navy, technicians, 
and scientists, is an important factor 
in explaining some hostilities that 
exist. Not all situations result in 
sabotage to the scientific goals of the 
voyage,, but conflicts' arise over port 
time, seating, and use of various 
sections of the ship. Usually the two 
groups interact as little as possible, 
a n. d n o t at all socially. S u.c h 
differences in values, interests, and 
background also show up in strain over 
music, leisure activities, and group 
membership*5
thinking. Lab technicians forget or 
miss steps in their work. Scientists 
at deep sea drilling projects have also 
been known to recommend unsound 
projects, forgetting the simple 
principles of their disciplines.6
Submarines
Scientists on these voyages also 
f ind ' it hard! to do any creative
During an 83-day cruise of the 
Trition, where 79 days of the 83 day 
mission were spent submerged in a 
circumnavigation of the world. The 
research results showed a "definite 
increase in feelings described as 
irritable, annoyed, disinterested, feel 
like giving up, bored stiff, 
uncomfortable, and frustrated".7
The general conclusion from the 
submarine studies seems to be that 
there is a negative decrement in 
overall alertness and reaction time. 
During World War II severe neurotic and 
psychotic behavior was observed during 
"silent running" when the ship was in 
danger or under attack.8,9
Undersea Laboratories
In the 30 day Ben Franklyn cruise 
carried out to determine psychological 
and physiological reactions to long 
duration and confinement, a crew of six 
men were towed in a submersible vessel 
down the East coast. The desire to 
participate was the main factor in crew 
selection, and compatibility was not 
used to determine crew membership. As 
the mission increased, the crew showed 
a general trend toward personal 
withdrawal and an increased need for 
privacy. Tension increased gradually, 
and all members of the crew experienced 
difficulty sleeping at different times 
during the mission. A major conflict 
arose between members of the crew and 
the surface staff resulting in failures 
and misunderstandings in communication, 
and bursts of anger and frustration. 
Indications about these interpersonal 
difficulties did not show up in early 
testing nor in the training time on the 
Langley Research Complex Coordinator. 
Crew proficiency was adversley affected 
in this case.10,11
Space Simulations
NASA engaged in a full scale 
simulation of a Spacelab flight in 
1977, having Principal Investigators go 
through all the p.repatory sequences for
a life-sciences mission during the 
preceeding year. The mission 
culminated in a 7 day simulated flight 
carried out at Johnson Space Center 
from May 17th to May 23 of 1977.
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The crew of the simulation (known 
as the SMD III) was composed of an 
astronaut Mission Specialist and two 
Payload Specialists, leaving out the 
astronaut pilot and co-pilot. Problems 
in the SMD III began during the 
preparation and training phases. 
Difficulties developed over the scope 
of decision-making authority regarding 
experiments and over lines of 
communication.12 Interpersonal tension 
was reported to be high throughout the 
7 day simulation. Overall, the 
problems resulted in disruption to some 
of the mission objectives.13
Dr. Joe Brady and his associate 
Dr. Henry Eumrian have been conducting 
simulations of confined microsocieties 
in an especially designed, programed 
environment for many years. These 
studies have shown that the way work 
and interpersonal contacts are 
organized have an important impact on 
the quality and amount of work done as 
well as crew morale and motivation. New 
members introduced into a group can be 
rejected, or can have a negative impact 
on total group work performance through 
being denied access to work facilities 
or because of individual reactions to 
the new members. Similar results in 
the quality and amount of work done and 
group interaction are found when the 
standards for work are altered, even 
slightly, with increases in 
testosterone and decreases in work 
output or outright refusal to work at 
all.14
THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE
The Salyut 6 Space Station ha^s 
been on orbit since early 1977, and has 
been the scene of four of the longest 
space missions to date: 96 days, 139 
days, 175 days, and 185 days (the 
longest American mission was 84 days 
flowm by a crew of three in the Skylab 
in 1974). Prime crews are composed of 
two cosmonauts who have visitations by 
two other cosmonauts at different times 
during the missions. The interior 
volume of the Salyut 6 Station is 
approximately 91 cubic meters (compared 
to 351 cubic meters in the Skylab or 71 
cubic meters in the Space Shuttle), or 
what you might have in a large motor 
home.
Prior to each mission, extensive 
tests and plans are undertaken by the 
Group for Psychological Support to 
ensure the compatibility of the crew
members and provide training for the 
flight. During each mission this Group
constantly monitors the crews over
television and by voice analysis to 
detect signs of stress, and is 
responsible for developing measures to 
deal with any symptoms that do 
develop.15,16
In spite of all these activities, 
General Georgi Beregovoi, Chief of Crew 
Training, reports that on all four of 
the long duration missions, the crews 
have developed signs of interpersonal 
hostility.17 Though he is quick to say 
that they do not get involved in fist 
fights (if that is possible in 
weightlessness), and the Soviets have 
concluded that incompatible people can 
work together in space on flights 
limited to a few weeks. However, on 
flights of a month it becomes a factor, 
and on longer flights compatability is 
essential. 18 The crews also 
demonstrate incidents of hostility with 
the ground control staff which have 
resulted in misunderstanding and errors 
in communication. They have held back 
on confidential messages and 
deliberately hidden information and 
reactions, showing considerable 
agitation at what they deem "constant 
nitpicking from the Earth".19 There is 
also a rumor that on the last 185 day 
mission cosmonauts Ryumin and Popov 
turned off all radio communication with 
the ground for two days.
The crews show mood swings, 
increases in tension, and difficulty 
sleeping. According to Cosmonaut 
Kovalenok, "In space you want to "load 
yourself with work so the time will go 
faster. Otherwise, you feel that the 
time slows down," and then you feel the 
lonliness, or you start thinking of 
aches, pains, sinus congestion, or your 
general physical condition.20
Since interpe rsonal r ela t ion ships 
are so intense, the Soviets have done 
away with the concept of commander and 
an "absolute emphasis of a hierarchical 
structure in a crew consisting of 2-3 
people".21
Multi-national crews are sent up 
to visit the long duration crews in 
order to break the boredom. However 
they can als o bring a de g r ee of
hostility, m i. s u n d e r s t a n d i ng r an d 
confusion based on language and value 
differences. C zec h Cosmonaut Rem ek 
commented that with the high stress 
t e n. s ion of f e e lings, u n i q u e c u, 11 u r a 1 
"mental features disrupt the harmony 
among crew members 11 and foreign, accents 
11 deform Russian expressions" leading to 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . L e a r n i n g t h e 
language of the flight crew so there is
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no need to translate is also an 
imperative for times of danger when 
there is so little time to translate 
from one language to another.22
The Soviets note that "from the 
standpoint of group psychological 
training, one should note that one can 
hardly rely upon selection in each case 
of an ideal crew".21 Satisfying the 
whole range of socio/psychological 
requirements is met by a program that 
combines selection in conjunction with 
an intensive program of psychological 
training.
In spite of all their programs, 
however, the Soviets still think that 
they have not reached a "scientifically 
founded and effective program of 
psychological training of the crew".19
STRESS AS A FACTOR OF SPACE FLIGHT
The precedent research and the 
Soviet experiences in the Salyut 6 
Space Station indicate that social and 
psychological factors become more 
salient the longer the duration of a 
mission. Two or three weeks seem to 
pose some problems, but small groups in 
isolated environments for longer 
periods show higher degrees of 
performance degradation traceable to 
human factors and the possible effects 
of weightlessness. If effectiveness and 
mission safety are to remain important 
goals, these variables need careful 
attention.
SYMPTOMS
SYMPTOMS OF ISOLATED 





O' Sleep Disorders 
o Hostility 
o Lowered Efficiency 
o Mood fluctuation. 
o Social Withdrawal 
o Vacillating Motivation 
o Fatigue





o Sleep Disorders 
o Anger
o Lowered Ef £ iciency 
o Excessive Emotion 
o Defensiveness 
o Lack of Concentration 
o Tiredness
Isolation and confinement in a 
hostile, dangerous environment are 
important factors in the generation of 
stress, but they should not be thought 
of as the only factors. Research in 
industrial social psychology, crowding, 
loneliness,organizational design, group 
dynamics, role relationships, small 
groups, social disorganization, etc. 
all show many of the same symptoms 
found in the precedent studies and the 
Soviet Salyut experiences. This 
research also indicates that reduction 
of some of these sources of stress is 
possible through the introduction of 
various training techniques and 
organizational systems.23
These symptoms of Generalized 
Stress have been traced to many 
different factors over a wide range of 
studies. Some are, conflicting 
definitions of a situation; mismatched 
work, organization, and leadership 
systems; scheduling; expectations; 
group size; reduced roles; boredom; 
reduced sensory input; architectural 
arrangements; group composition; 
training; sexually mixed groups; 
communication systems; physiological 
factors, etc. Some of the causes of 
these symptoms can be eliminated or 
mitigated, some must simply be 
recogonized and accepted.
Solutions to some of these 
problems are possible through 
pre-flight socio/psychological 
training, attention to group 
organizational systems and dynamics, 
and the relationship of human 
individual and group requirements to 
the design of space-based working and 
living environments. Since groups can 
develop as a important buffer to 
stress, elimination of as many areas of 
tension as is possible can go a long 
way in bringing about mission 
effectiveness, safety, and the 
creative, satisfying interaction of the 
people involved.
CONCLUSION
Up until now American space 
science and engineering has worked with 
the aim of optimizing all systems for 
safety and success. The results have 
been a remarkable achievement. As the 
windows of expectations expand to 
longer and longer missions, however, 
there is ample evidence that the human 
spirit may buckle under some of the 
conditions posed by space habitation. 
The same attitude toward optimization 
of space craft systems for safety and 
success also applies to the human
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factor in the loop. Humans are not 
infinitely adaptable. The boundaries 
of tolerance of the conditions of space 
flight seem to be found after a three 
month stay r extending as the time 
continues. When the same approach that 
is given to the inclusion of a piece of 
hardware is applied to the human 
factor, this boundary may be 
significantly extended. A good 
engineer is not going to place a system 
into a spacecraft until as much as 
possible is understood about the 
tolerances of that hardware, its 
relationship to various environmental 
circumstances, and its capabilities. A 
similar approach to the human factor 
gives the crewmember the advantage of 
much more knowledge to deal with the 
unexpected, and more alternatives to 
cope with anticipated trials. Workable 
techniques are available, and can be 
adjusted to the special circumstances 
of space. Not to do so would leave the 
most facile element in the loop, the 
human being, subject to needless 
ignorance, randomly developed social 
systems, and unnecessary hazards. The 
conclusion reached by the National 
Academy of Sciences in 1972 is even 
more true today: "If man is to 
participate in long duration space 
flight, his requirements — physical, 
pyscho 1ogica 1 , behavioral, and 
interpersonal — must be given far more 
attention than has heretofore been the 
case in the design of the spacecraft 
and the mission."24
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